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Natural resources can contribute to economic growth, employment, and fiscal revenues. But many resource-rich and resource-dependent countries are, in fact, 
characterized by disappointing growth rates, high inequality and wide-spread impoverishment, bad governance, and an increased risk of civil violence. A vast 
body of literature is devoted to the issue of intrastate resource conflicts. These studies can be broadly divided into two groups: studies which focus on re-
source scarcity and conflict, and studies that analyse the relationship between resource abundance and conflict. While studying resources and intrastate con-
flict is anything but new, we show that the main findings from the literature, which are often conflicting, are difficult to compare due to a lack of adequate, 
general definitions and measurements of scarcity, abundance, and conflict. After overviews of research on resource scarcity and conflict and on resource abun-
dance and conflict, we discuss the central terminology and approaches to measuring independent and dependent variables (resources and conflict).
Access to natural resources is increasingly perceived as the 
security risk of the twenty-first century. Natural resources 
are, according to the WTO, “stocks of materials that exist in 
the natural environment that are both scarce and economi-
cally useful in production or consumption, either in their 
raw state or after a minimal amount of processing” (WTO 
2010).1 They include renewable (water, land, forest, fish, 
etc.) and depletable resources (minerals, metals, oil, dia-
monds, etc.). According to the High Level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change, which was convened by 
former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in 2004, com-
modity shortages can help trigger social unrest and civil 
wars. In 2009, the UNEP’s Expert Advisory Group on En-
vironment, Conflict and Peacebuilding found that “there is 
significant potential for conflicts over natural resources to 
intensify in the coming decades” (UNEP 2009).
As the 2010 Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict 
Research Conflict Barometer (HIIK 2010) shows, resource 
conflicts are a serious phenomenon. Although the Conflict 
Barometer documents only seven cases where resources 
were the sole cause, overall, resources were the second-most 
frequent conflict item in the 363 conflicts recorded in 2010 
(80 cases representing 22 percent; after system/ideology 
with 117 cases). Resources typically occur together with 
other conflict items: territory, regional predominance, sys-
tem/ideology, autonomy and secession. The data also show 
that resources are the predominant conflict item in Sub-
Saharan Africa (32 of 85, 38 percent) – far more than in 
other regions of the world. The HIIK also finds that in 2010 
intrastate conflicts involving resources were considerably 
more common than interstate conflicts, with 50 cases com-
pared to 30. Of 32 resource conflicts in Africa, 25 took 
place within states, while only seven were interstate con-
flicts. Interstate conflicts were also less violent on average: 
They were assigned an intensity level of 1 or 2 (where 5 
equals war). In contrast, of 25 conflicts within African 
countries, only ten were of minor, or low intensity (level 1 
1 For a discussion of the term “scarcity,” please see 
section 3. “The Challenge of Definitions: Scarcity, 
Abundance, and Conflict.”
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or 2), while twelve conflicts were of medium intensity (level 
3), two were severe crises (level 4) and one conflict was a 
war (level 5) (HIIK 2010).
The vast body of literature devoted to analysing the relation-
ship between resources and conflict can be broadly divided 
into two groups: studies which focus on resource scarcity 
and conflict, and studies that analyse the relationship be-
tween resource abundance and conflict. The methods ap-
plied vary from vast quantitative efforts (econometric 
modelling and statistical regressions, cross-country and 
time-series analyses) to qualitative analyses (comparative 
and individual case studies). We broadly follow the timeline 
in which the literature (journal articles and books) has 
evolved, but divide it according to research questions, ap-
plied methods, and results, highlighting the main findings 
and conflicting evidence as well as identifying remaining re-
search gaps.
We start with an overview of studies on resource scarcity and 
conflict. Many early studies found a positive relationship be-
tween resource scarcity and conflict. They suggest that de-
priving people of their livelihoods leaves them no choice but 
to fight for survival. The relationship between resource scar-
city and conflict remains highly contested, however. Critics 
argue that there are too many intervening non-environ-
mental variables to establish a direct link between popu-
lation growth and scarcity-induced conflicts or that real 
scarcity rarely occurs because technological innovation, sub-
stitution, and international trade provide remedies.
We discuss resource abundance and conflict in the second 
part of our review. Advocates of this school of thought 
originally identified two causes of such conflicts: similar to 
conflicts involving resource scarcity, “grievances”, i.e. the 
deprivation of basic needs, can be the cause. In addition, 
“greed”, i.e. opportunistic and selfish appropriation of re-
sources, can trigger conflict. Le Billon (2008) calls the 
grievance mechanism “resource conflicts”: conflicts arising 
due to control of a resource by one group that excludes 
others or destroys the resources they depend on for a liv-
ing. He calls the greed mechanism “conflict resources” be-
cause some resources motivate civilians, soldiers, and state 
officials to enrich themselves. In The Political Economy of 
Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance (2003), how-
ever, Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman argue that the in-
centives to start or prolong a conflict are more complex 
than previously suggested. Not only can greed and griev-
ance both be the causes of a conflict. Economic consider-
ations may motivate conflicts in some cases, in others they 
are not the root cause, contributing instead to pre-existing 
causes of conflict. This section is therefore divided into two 
subparts. The first discusses studies that focus on rebels as 
the main actors; the second summarizes the literature on 
weak states.
The third part of our review is devoted to a discussion of 
central terminology and approaches to measuring inde-
pendent and dependent variables (resources and conflict). 
In general, scarcity, abundance, and conflict are still not 
satisfactorily defined, and scholars frequently use diverging 
definitions. This reduces explanatory power to the extent 
that comparisons of results become quite difficult.
In view of the enormous number of studies on the issue, it 
is necessary to limit our focus. First of all, we concentrate 
on violent, intrastate conflicts. As the 2010 HIIK data show, 
intrastate resource conflicts were more common than in-
ternational or regional conflicts. Besides, there are few 
studies on violent, interstate conflicts because international 
negotiations have – so far – been more successful at pre-
venting violent outbreaks between states. The region most 
affected by resource conflicts is Sub-Saharan Africa. It does 
not come as a surprise that many of the studies we review 
also focus on this region. The focus on African intrastate 
conflicts explains why we selected certain resources, such as 
land, forests, oil, metals and diamonds, and give less at-
tention to drug and international water conflicts, even 
though they also can pose significant conflict risks.
1. Resource Scarcity and Conflict
Many researchers, among them Homer-Dixon (1994), 
Bächler, Böge, and Klötzli (1996), Hauge and Ellingsen 
(1998), Raleigh and Urdal (2007), and Urdal (2008), find a 
positive relationship between resource scarcity and conflict. 
They suggest that depriving people of their livelihoods 
leaves them no choice apart from fighting for survival. Fol-
lowing a neo-Malthusian line of argument, they assume 
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that population growth reduces the availability of natural 
resources because populations grow faster than food 
supplies. This induces competition and, ultimately, con-
flicts over means of existence. The research group led by 
Thomas Homer-Dixon (1999) is often cited as this per-
spective’s most decisive representative. According to their 
research, conflicts take three forms: conflicts between 
states, group identity conflicts, and civil strife and insur-
gency. Empirical evidence from earlier studies suggests, 
first, that international conflict over scarce (mostly renew-
able) resources is rare. Second, scarcity can initiate mi-
gration, resulting in ethnic conflict and rivalry in the host 
area. Third, scarcity often causes economic deprivation and 
ensuing conflict, especially when institutions prove inef-
fective. Fourth, developing countries suffer greater harm 
from scarcity and conflict because they are less well-
equipped to alleviate grievances.
However, this line of reasoning has been heavily challenged. 
Critics of the neo-Malthusian approach either argue that 
there are too many intervening non-environmental variables 
to establish a direct link between population growth and 
scarcity-induced conflicts (Le Billon 2001; Bates et al. 2003; 
Giordano, Giordano, and Wolf 2005; Theisen 2008; Brown 
2010) or, as in the cornucopian tradition, that absolute scar-
city rarely occurs because of, first and foremost, tech-
nological innovation, substitution, and international trade 
(Boserup 1965; Simon 1996; Lomborg 2001; Juul 2005; 
Mortimore 2005). Cornucopian scholars are convinced that 
people are able to substitute resources or invent new tech-
nologies, creating remedies for scarcity. The concept of so-
cial resilience – intelligent human beings are able to adapt to 
environmental changes – gives rise to a similar interpre-
tation of scarcity: Scarcity is not necessarily a threat to liveli-
hood, but an opportunity to be flexible, given adequate 
means. Over the last few years, the question has become sa-
lient again due to the threat of climate change-induced scar-
city (Barnett and Adger 2007; Reuveny 2007; Hendrix and 
Glaser 2007; Raleigh and Urdal 2007; Meier, Bond, and 
Bond 2007).
The following figure is a schematic illustration of the mech-
anisms leading to scarcity and, possibly, conflict. The box 
on the left shows which factors, according to the literature, 
induce scarcity. Once resource scarcity has been identified, 
studies search for a causal relationship with conflict.
Figure 1: How resource scarcity can cause conflict
Independent Variables Dependent Variable
• Population growth/
 Environmental degradation
• Institutional failure
•  Unequal power relations
Resource
scarcity
Violent
conflict
1.1. Demand-Induced Scarcity and Violent Conflict: Population Growth
Does resource scarcity cause violent conflict? And if so, 
under which conditions? The starting point for our liter-
ature review is the Canadian Environmental Change and 
Acute Conflict Project led by Thomas Homer-Dixon (1994; 
1999). The project approached the research question from a 
neo-Malthusian perspective. Homer-Dixon developed a 
theoretical model based on sixteen case studies, assuming 
scarcity to result from three factors: (1) degradation and 
depletion of cropland, forests, water, and fish stocks, (2) in-
creased demand through population growth and/or rising 
living standards, and (3) unequal distribution of resources 
(1994). These factors could contribute to violent conflict in 
the form of ethnic clashes, insurgency, banditry or military 
coups. For example, a dwindling supply of renewable re-
sources could induce powerful groups to shift resource dis-
tribution in their favour, leaving less and less for poorer 
and weaker groups (“resource capture”). Ensuing griev-
ances then cause violence and conflict. Furthermore, in-
creasing resource scarcity could trigger mass migration 
and, as a consequence, resource degradation or depletion in 
other regions. People native to the host region might feel 
their livelihood is threatened and use violence as a means to 
assert power, the consequence being ethnic clashes (“eco-
logical marginalization”). In a case study of South Africa, 
Homer-Dixon and Percival (1998) tested the model and hy-
pothesized that pre-election turmoil was caused by land de-
gradation and fuel/wood/water scarcity in combination 
with high population density. Admitting that other factors, 
such as ethnicity, strong group identities, and the transition 
to democracy, contributed to the conflicts, they concluded 
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that grievances were exacerbated by migration, scarcities in 
urban black communities, poverty, and manipulation of 
access by warlords, leading to violence.
However, Homer-Dixon’s research team was harshly criti-
cized for its generalizations. Goldstone (2001), for example, 
called for specification of the independent variables en-
vironment and population and the dependent variable con-
flict. Concerning environmental factors, his empirical 
evidence since the 1970s showed that long-term degra-
dation alone did not cause large-scale violence. More often, 
scarcity was a contributing factor in previously unstable 
areas. Turning to population variables, Goldstone criticizes 
that it is not population growth or density alone that causes 
violence. Instead, he finds that rapid urbanization and edu-
cation, a growing proportion of youth in the population, 
and unequal growth of different ethnic groups, for example 
through migration, contribute to the onset of domestic vi-
olent conflicts. In addition, he questions the homogeneity 
of the dependent variable conflict, rightly pointing out that 
not all resource conflicts had to be violent. More often, they 
are resolved peacefully through negotiations and compro-
mise as armed conflict is the most expensive solution.
Several studies question population as the sole driver of 
conflict. While Urdal (2005), for example, finds that popu-
lation growth and land scarcity are significantly and posi-
tively related, he argues that armed conflict onset could be 
better explained with other variables, including unstable re-
gimes, slow economic growth, and a low level of devel-
opment. In the end, most quantitative cross-country 
regression analyses fail to establish a clear causal relation-
ship between population-induced resource scarcity and 
conflict as many other variables may affect the likeliness of 
an outbreak. For example, Timura (2001) criticizes Homer-
Dixon’s macro-level model for its lack of a proper contex-
tual analysis of social and cultural components, including 
history, perception, and local economies, which impede 
good policy solutions. Tir and Diehl (1998) indicate that 
population growth and density are only weakly related to 
conflict initiation and escalation to war. However, a third 
dependent variable, involvement in militarized interstate 
disputes, is significantly and positively related to popu-
lation growth, in particular if military spending is high. Tir 
and Diehl also find that not all countries are equally vul-
nerable to conflict risks. Countries with a high level of tech-
nological development were better equipped to reduce the 
effects of population growth on conflict formation.
1.2. Supply-Induced Scarcity and Violent Conflict: Environmental Degrada-
tion and Conflict
It is admittedly difficult to draw a clear line between en-
vironmental degradation and population growth as sources 
of scarcity. Nonetheless, some authors have shifted the 
focus from the variable population to environment. The 
most prominent of these projects is the Swiss Environ-
ments and Conflict Project of Bächler, Böge, and Klötzli 
(1996), who summarize their theoretical and empirical re-
sults on degradation and armed conflict in three volumes. 
The project concludes, first, that degradation of renewable 
resources contributes to violent conflicts in regions of 
political, economic, and social instability. Second, armed 
conflict related to environmental degradation only erupts if 
several of the following conditions occur simultaneously: 
degraded resources are not substitutable and people de-
pend on them for their existence; powerful institutions to 
ensure sustainable use of resources are not present; en-
vironmental degradation is used by groups with special in-
terests to construct group identities; organization and 
armament is possible; there are pre-existing conflicts.
As influential as Bächler’s research was a project launched 
by the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo 
(PRIO), publishing its results in the institute’s Journal of 
Peace Research. Hauge and Ellingsen (1998) analyse en-
vironmental variables and conflict (1980 to 1992) in a 
mixed cross-sectional and diachronic analysis and a pure 
cross-sectional analysis. Their dependent variable “inci-
dence” is operationalized as domestic armed conflict (be-
tween two or more organized parties, of which at least one 
was the government, with at least 25 annual battle deaths) 
and civil war (at least 1,000 annual battle deaths). As a proxy 
for the severity of conflict they used battle deaths as a per-
centage of the total population. Independent variables were 
the annual change in forest coverage, land degradation, 
freshwater availability per capita, population density, and 
income inequality. They find that land degradation is posi-
tively related to armed conflict and civil war. The variables 
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deforestation and freshwater availability, on the other hand, 
were only significant with regard to the less severe category 
of armed conflict, not civil war. But their results were put 
into perspective by fellow PRIO researcher Theisen in 2008, 
who finds that land degradation did enlarge conflict risks, 
but economic factors were more important. Theisen em-
phasizes the role of poverty, state capacity, and institutional 
instability, questioning whether it was resource scarcity or 
rather unequal distribution that caused conflicts.
In the course of the recent climate change debate, the issue 
has regained prominence. An issue of the journal Political 
Geography in 2007 dedicated to climate change and conflict 
represented a first attempt to build a framework linking 
climate change impacts to conflict. Nordås and Gleditsch 
(2007) review the literature and identify a knowledge gap: 
the causal chains between climate change and conflict have 
hardly been explored. Effects of climate change, such as ris-
ing sea levels, flooding, and drought, can significantly alter 
the availability of natural resources, most importantly land 
and water, that are crucial for agricultural production. 
Conflict may arise either directly in the battle for liveli-
hoods or indirectly as a consequence of migration. Barnett 
and Adger (2007) argue that a climate change-induced re-
duction in quantity and quality of natural resources in-
crease the risk of conflict. They see the main cause of 
conflict in better recruitment opportunities for rebel 
movements, especially in those countries where a majority 
of the population depends on the primary sector for em-
ployment. According to Reuveny (2007), failing mitigation 
efforts resulting in migration were a second hazard. He ar-
gues that migration could give rise to violent conflict 
through four different channels: competition for resources, 
ethnic tension, distrust among origin and host area, and 
socioeconomic fault lines. The risk of conflict increased if 
the host area depended largely on the environment for a 
livelihood, experienced resource scarcity, and additionally 
had to deal with political instability. Gleditsch, Nordås, and 
Salehyan (2007) point to the link between climate change, 
migration, and conflict, as refugees may bring along arms, 
organizational structures, social networks, and ideas. Miti-
gating resource competition, and establishing represen-
tative institutions, economic redistribution, and state 
capacity are the challenges to tackle, they stress.
A quantitative study by Raleigh and Urdal (2007), covering 
the period between 1990 and 2004, clarifies that climate 
change-induced land and water scarcities only trigger 
armed conflict if there are medium to high scarcity levels 
of land and very high scarcity levels of water. The likeli-
hood of conflict increased further when political and econ-
omic variables are included in the model. A quantitative 
study of temperatures between 1981 and 2002 in Sub-
Saharan Africa found that warmer temperatures strongly 
and positively correlated with an increase in armed conflict 
(Burke et al. 2009). Buhaug (2010) challenges the robust-
ness of this result. When the conflict variable was expanded 
to include not only civil wars with more than 1,000 annual 
battle deaths but also smaller conflicts, temperature was 
not a reliable predictor of conflict in Africa. Besides, he ar-
gues, Africa has seen rising temperatures but fewer civil 
wars over the last decade. Buhaug claims that ethnic margi-
nalization, poor economic performance, and the collapse 
of the Cold War system offer better explanations.
There is a large body of literature that finds no significant 
relationship between resource scarcity and conflict. In their 
quantitative studies using global data from 1955 to 2002, 
Bates and colleagues (2003), for example, are unable to find 
any significant relationship between environmental vari-
ables and political instability (sustained violent conflict in 
revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, genocides, and politi-
cides). Binningsbø, de Soysa, and Gleditsch (2007) choose 
ecological footprint, biocapacity, and ecological reserve or 
deficit as independent variables. Drawing on a cross-
sectional dataset from the period 1961 to 1999, they fail to 
establish a clear relationship. Quite the contrary, increased 
demand for resources might predict peace as a proxy for 
economic and social development.
Brown (2010) measured environmental degradation in 
Northern and Western Darfur between 1981 and 2006 with 
the Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI), which 
is an indicator of ecological change where high values mean 
greater land availability. In parallel, he studied violent con-
flict between farmers and pastoralists, ethnic conflict, re-
bellion against government, and intra-community conflict 
in Sudan. The results speak against a relationship between 
land degradation and violent conflict because the resource 
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situation did not deteriorate immediately prior to conflicts. 
In Western Darfur State, vegetation actually improved.
1.3. Institutions Matter
As the discussion in section 1.2. shows, not every case of 
resource scarcity necessarily produces violent conflict. This 
may be because various institutions are able to resolve non-
violent conflicts over scarce resources before they escalate. 
North (1990) defines institutions as incentives that guide 
individual behaviour, interactions with others, and society 
in general. Informal institutions are a set of rules or norms 
that are not legally stipulated and are enforced by social 
mechanisms instead of state agencies; formal institutions 
are a set of rules fixed in regulations and constitutions 
(North 1990). Giordano, Giordano, and Wolf (2005), for 
instance, do not deny that resource scarcities exist and that 
they could potentially cause conflict. However, they say that 
a discussion focusing on the supply and demand of natural 
resources is too narrow. Establishing a theoretical frame-
work on the basis of this assumption leads them to claim 
that risk of international conflict is increased where in-
stitutions are ill-defined, do not exist, or cannot keep up 
with the pace of environmental change.
But failing institutions are not only a problem in inter-
national conflicts – they can also destabilize a country inter-
nally and cause violence to break out. Government 
institutions in Colombia, for example, have proven unable 
to end agrarian conflicts (Elhawary 2007). Several land re-
forms introduced over the course of the twentieth century 
failed in their aim of redistributing land and compensating 
groups. Because contesting claims could not be settled, viol-
ent conflicts over land control recommenced. Subsequent 
flows of migration caused the government to pass a law pro-
tecting displaced people’s land in 1997. Enforcement of this 
law was impeded by a lack of capacities and coordination as 
well as corruption and rent-seeking. The case of tropical fis-
heries in Ghana, Bangladesh, and the Turks and Caicos Is-
lands also underlines the importance of institutions. 
Bennett and colleagues (2001) offer valuable clues about the 
role of formal and informal institutions. In Bangladesh a 
largely corrupt government failed to support community ef-
forts; conflict management institutions were largely absent. 
In Ghana decentralization did not have the desired effects 
because resources for enforcement had been eliminated. In 
the Turks and Caicos Islands special interests in government 
institutions impeded proper management. Bennett and col-
leagues conclude that governments should support local-
level conflict resolution by managing information flows. 
With their analysis of a gold mine in Papua New Guinea, 
Walton and Barnett (2008) confirm that slowness of resol-
ution processes can trigger conflict. Here, unequal dis-
tribution of environmental impacts and compensation 
payments led to non-cooperation and resistance.
Institutions that regulate access to and control of natural 
resources do not simply appear; they evolve over time pro-
ducing a certain distribution. Political ecology analyses the 
historical, cultural, economic, and political structures that 
shape power relations, which in turn influence the devel-
opment of institutions. Manger (2005), for example, recog-
nizes adverse institutions in Sudan but concentrates on the 
power relations leading to these outcomes: new land tenure 
laws were strongly influenced by colonial history and post-
colonial regimes. Government agents used these laws for 
private interests and enabled so-called land-grabbing, 
which was further encouraged by current privatization ten-
dencies. Conflicts seemed to be caused by land privatiz-
ation and water monopolization; population pressure and 
environmental degradation made the situation more acute. 
In his analysis of Cameroon, Gausset (2005) argues that 
relative scarcity – the perceived gap between resources and 
needs that impairs personal well-being – is most sig-
nificant. Although population density is low, violence can 
arise out of agropastoral conflicts due to different per-
ceptions and uses of the same resource, different systems of 
management, power, and justice, and different cultural and 
ethical perspectives (Gausset 2005). In northern Thailand, 
declining forest cover and conservation policies may have 
had a negative effect on peace but ethnic conflicts are more 
likely to be the underlying cause of violence (Wittayapak 
2008). Analyses of various regions come to similar con-
clusions: ethnic and economic inequality are the central 
problems, not declining resource availability (Moyo 2005, 
Mollett 2006, Jewitt 2008, Benjaminsen, Ba 2009).
To sum up, it is possible for quantitative studies to ap-
proximate scarcity with variables such as population 
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growth, but qualitative analyses show that they do not cap-
ture all aspects of scarcity. Case studies that include in-
stitutions and power relations in their analysis paint 
different pictures of resource scarcity. Hence, it remains 
unclear which factors cause relative scarcity and whether 
scarcity is a main driver of conflict.
2. Resource Abundance and Conflict
While resource scarcity remains a contested independent 
variable, resource abundance has found stronger support 
among conflict scholars. Around the turn of the century, 
various authors highlighted a possible relationship between 
resource abundance and conflict, adding to the literature 
on the so-called resource curse (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; 
Le Billon 2001; de Soysa 2002a, 2002b). Abundance studies 
differentiate between rebel organizations and the govern-
ment as actors. According to the “looting rebels model”, re-
source abundance can represent an opportunity to either 
finance a rebellion or to exploit resource wealth for person-
al enrichment (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004). While 
Collier and Hoeffler consider greed the underlying motive 
(2004), rebel behaviour can also be motivated by poverty 
among the population.
In contrast, the “state capacity model” considers the gov-
ernment as the central actor primarily responsible for con-
flict (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Resource rents are an 
additional source of government revenue that can weaken 
state institutions through rent-seeking behaviour and make 
conflict more likely. Weakened state institutions can facili-
tate state capture by rebel groups. An alternative model, the 
“rentier state model” (Beblawi and Luciani 1987; Basedau 
and Lacher 2006), claims that state authorities become 
stronger and more repressive, exacerbating grievances 
among the population (see figure below). Le Billon (2008) 
calls state-centred mechanisms the “resource curse,” where 
the government plays a central role in facilitating or con-
taining conflict. While this review separates the actors, it 
should be kept in mind that the conflict lines and who 
benefits from resources are not always that clear. In Angola, 
for example, resources financed conflict: Offshore oil pro-
duction benefitted the government, whereas diamonds 
mostly sustained the rebel group (Renner 2002; Cater 2003; 
Le Billon 2005).
Additional mechanisms have been identified (Humphreys 
2005), and resource and conflict characteristics specified 
(Ross 2003, 2004; Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2004; 
Fearon 2004; Le Billon 2005; Basedau and Lacher 2006; de 
Soysa and Neumayer 2007; Welsch 2008; Lujala 2009). Be-
cause some studies contest the relationship between re-
source abundance and conflict (Regan and Norton 2005; 
Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2009; Thies 2010), more research 
has recently been dedicated to clarifying intervening (con-
text) variables such as socio-economic development and 
institutional quality (Snyder and Bhavnani 2005; Snyder 
2006; Dunning 2005; Franke, Hampel-Milagrosa, and 
Schure 2007; Sarr and Wick 2010).
Figure 2: How resource abundance or dependence can cause conflict
Independent Variable
Resource
abundance/
dependence
Intervening Variable
Rebel organizations
Weak/strong
government
Dependent Variable
Violent
domestic
conflict
Before engaging in a discussion of mechanisms and specify-
ing resource characteristics, two recent reviews of the liter-
ature on resource abundance and conflict should be 
mentioned. Rosser (2006) surveys the entire literature on 
the resource curse, distinguishing the effect of resources on 
economic performance, civil war, and regime type. Our re-
view is limited to discussing the second group. Rosser argues 
that there are not enough studies focusing on the political 
and economic contexts that shape outcomes in resource-
rich countries. We present a few at the end of this section 
but generally agree with his finding. Samset’s review (2009) 
is a good introduction to the abundance literature, defining 
the most important terms and explaining the connections 
between abundance and conflict. The idea that research 
should examine how renewable and depletable resources in-
teract to produce violence is an important conclusion.
2.1 Rebels – Opportunity and Feasibility
Collier and Hoeffler (1998) were at the forefront of show-
ing that civil war has economic causes, arguing that the risk 
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of conflict is determined by the benefits and costs of re-
bellion. Originally, they claimed that rebellion was triggered 
by the pursuit of personal enrichment (greed). Violent in-
surgency occurs when there is opportunity to loot (“oppor-
tunity hypothesis”). Rebels weigh the costs of rebellion, 
expressed in foregone income, against the benefits, reflected 
in a country’s revenue flow from primary commodity ex-
ports. The analysis includes onset and duration of civil war 
(organized military action with at least 1,000 annual battle 
deaths) between 1960 and 1992 as dependent variables. In 
2004, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) revised their previous as-
sumption – post-conflict benefits to rebels have to cover the 
costs of rebellion – now claiming that benefits can also in 
themselves be a cause of conflict. In this case, a civil war 
erupts because of revenue flows in the form of primary 
commodity exports. Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004) con-
firm the hypothesis of a link between lucrative resource en-
dowments and the risk of civil war. Further, they supposed 
a higher per capita income to decrease the likelihood of 
conflict, possibly due to recruits’ higher opportunity costs 
of war. Another interesting result was an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between conflict and abundance. This means 
that very high levels of resource abundance are less likely to 
lead to conflict than lower levels. In other analyses, this re-
lationship has been used to explain the rentier state model 
(Basedau and Lay 2009).
Building on these findings – that resource rents are a moti-
vation for rebels to start a civil war – Collier, Hoeffler, and 
Söderbom (2004) analyse the factors that affected the du-
ration of civil war between 1960 and 1999, again from an 
economic perspective. Three different reasons for pro-
longation were examined: Rebellion is an investment, a busi-
ness, or a mistake. Their empirical analysis supports the 
second and third explanations. Theoretically, rebellion could 
be seen as an investment. If the outcome of a conflict, such 
as natural resource rents, was profitable, rebels would accept 
higher costs of a prolonged (violent) conflict. This implies 
that expected revenues have to cover costs. Winning a civil 
war could have political payoffs (end repression) or financial 
ones (gain a share in primary commodity exports). Open-
ness of political institutions and pre-conflict share of pri-
mary commodity exports had no effect on the duration of 
civil war in this analysis. Rebellion as a mistake or as busi-
ness have more explanatory power. In the first case, chances 
of victory were perceived as overly optimistic; in the second 
case, rebels gained from conflict because benefits during 
conflict were higher than costs. This also worked in reverse: 
A high share of primary commodities in exports and declin-
ing world market prices of these export goods reduced the 
duration of conflict because rebellion became less profitable. 
The most significant results, however, were reported for per 
capita income and income inequality. High inequality and 
low income lengthened civil wars because rebels had low op-
portunity costs, reducing the prospects for peace.
Recently, Collier and Hoeffler distanced themselves from the 
“greed” versus “grievance” debate, that is, from motivation 
as a cause of conflict, and reformulated their model, propos-
ing a “feasibility hypothesis”: Rebellion will occur where it is 
materially feasible (financially, militarily) (Collier, Hoeffler, 
and Rohner 2009). The authors show with an extended data-
set that rebellion occurred whereever it was feasible. Pre-
vious results are confirmed, but new variables offer more 
clarity with regard to the causal mechanisms. This ex-
planation does not contradict the “opportunity hypothesis” 
but rather complements it. Greed can still be a motivation of 
conflict, but it is only one among many. Collier, Hoeffler, and 
Rohner (2009) explain the difference in their paper: “Our 
own thinking on proneness to civil war has also evolved. As 
implied by the title ‘greed and grievance’, our previous paper 
was still rooted in the traditional focus on the motivation for 
rebellion. Since then our work has increasingly called into 
question whether motivation is as important as past em-
phasis upon it had implied (Collier and Hoeffler 2007). In-
stead of the circumstances which generate a rebellion being 
distinctive in terms of motivation, they might be distinctive 
in the sheer financial and military feasibility of rebellion.”
Several case studies illustrate the importance of particular 
resources – especially diamonds and minerals – in financ-
ing rebellion. Sierra Leone is widely known for its high 
quality “blood diamonds,” but also for recurring re-
bellions, banditry, and coups throughout the 1990s. The 
Revolutionary United Front sought to control diamond 
production in order to finance arms purchases and for in-
dividual enrichment. Soldiers often collaborated with re-
bels, engaging in looting and illegal mining (Renner 2002; 
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Cater 2003). However, a resource’s characteristics are a 
decisive determining factor for rebel looting to occur, in 
particular its lootability. Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore 
(2005) point out that primary diamonds, which are more 
labour- and capital-intensive than secondary diamonds 
and hence more difficult to extract, make conflict less 
likely. Secondary, or alluvial, diamond production occurs 
where diamonds are found in loose soil or sediments. This 
does not require much capital investment as the diamonds 
are picked by hand or using shovels. Primary diamonds, on 
the other hand, are found in kimberlite and have to be 
mined, requiring investment in technology. While Sierra 
Leone is rich in secondary diamonds, Botswana has pre-
dominantly primary diamonds. Diamond production in 
general is associated with ethnic civil wars, but only after it 
has started. The discovery of diamond deposits does not af-
fect the risk of civil war. A comprehensive discussion of the 
conditions for diamond conflicts is also provided by Le Bil-
lon (2008). In Côte d’Ivoire, diamonds and gold are con-
centrated in the rebel zone and therefore benefited above 
all rebel forces. Although cocoa was more profitable, in 
part due to its legality, the regional concentration and il-
legal status of these resources advantaged rebels relative to 
the government, which cannot engage in illegal trade 
(Guesnet, Müller, and Schure 2009).
Another prominent example is the DR Congo with its abun-
dant deposits of copper, coltan, cobalt, gold, and diamonds, 
among others. In the two wars starting in 1996 and 1998, re-
bels already benefited from resource deals even though they 
did not control the country. Other African countries got in-
volved and used the opportunity to plunder. As a con-
sequence, allies were rewarded with rights to resources 
(Renner 2002; Cater 2003). As the case of the DR Congo 
shows, diamonds may be at the center of media attention, 
but other minerals can also be the source of intense conflict.
In contrast to Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Fearon (2005) is 
unable to establish a causal relationship between primary 
commodity exports, rebel funding, and civil war. While 
confirming Collier and Hoeffler’s finding that income per 
capita correlates negatively with conflict, Fearon and Laitin 
(2003) interpret conflicts not as the result of opportunity 
costs but rather as a measure of state capacity. They con-
clude that resource rents (in this case oil) weaken state in-
stitutions, facilitating state capture by rebel groups.
2.2 States – Weak and Strong Capacity
The other major causal mechanism that links resources 
and conflict involves a state’s financial, administrative, and 
political capability. Resources can weaken state capacity – 
in particular where institutions are already weak – or 
strengthen it. The literature suggests that weakened state 
capacity often leads to conflict whereas rulers of strong 
states are able to secure their position over a long period of 
time without being seriously contested.
Weak state capacity increases the risk of conflict through 
three mechanisms: incentivizing rent-seeking behaviour, 
causing shortages of public goods, and limiting the ability 
to end violent conflict. Incompetent management of re-
source rents and unequal treatment of a large part of the 
population can easily result in violent conflict, while per-
sonal enrichment is likely to prolong armed rebellion.
Resources tempt individuals to engage in rent-seeking 
competition rather than productive economic activities 
(Auty 2001, 2007, 2009; Torvik 2001; Gylfason 2004). This 
is the case particularly in conjunction with ill-defined 
property rights, imperfect or missing markets, and lax legal 
structures in many developing countries. Rent-seeking can 
breed corruption, thus distorting the allocation of re-
sources and reducing both economic efficiency and social 
equity. It can also lead to a concentration of economic and 
political power in the hands of a few, who skew the dis-
tribution of income and wealth in their favour.
Furthermore, resource revenues tempt governments to rely 
on these flows instead of imposing taxes on corporate and 
personal incomes (Heller 2006: 25). In their quantitative 
study, Bornhorst, Gupta, and Thornton (2009) look for 
evidence of an offset between government revenues from 
hydrocarbon-related activities (oil and gas) and revenues 
from other domestic sources, using a panel of thirty hydro-
carbon-producing countries. They find an offset of about 
20 percent: A 1 percent increase in resource revenues re-
duces non-resource revenues by about 0.2 percent. While 
the authors do not explain this reduction, McGuirk (2010) 
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offers a reason. His quantitative study takes a closer look at 
taxes and accountability, finding that in the presence of 
high natural resource rents, the political elite lowers the 
burden of taxation on citizens in order to reduce ac-
countability. Thus, taxation is an important tool for engag-
ing citizens, for increasing scrutiny, and for implementing 
accountability (Weinthal and Luong 2006). Governments 
that do not depend on the population’s approval (and tax 
income) tend to provide fewer public goods (health system, 
education, security, etc.).
Van Klinken (2008) offers a third reason why weak state ca-
pacity is related to conflict by analysing timber in Indone-
sia. This easily lootable resource was one of the main 
causes of pogroms against a minority in Indonesia in 
1996-97 and 1999. Although the central government was 
never directly involved in the conflicts, it contributed indi-
rectly due to its inability to contain ethnic violence. It was 
especially weak in timber-rich regions because local leaders 
financed their offices with illegal timber trading and re-
tained taxes from reforestation, weakening the central gov-
ernment’s influence. Local autonomy was both a cause and 
a consequence of rent-seeking. When Indonesia underwent 
political transition, local elites seized the opportunity to 
expand their power. Timber was strategically deployed to 
buy military and police protection in support of an ethnic 
group. By the time violence broke out, abundant timber re-
sources had strengthened factions and weakened central 
government control.
One of the few quantitative studies to measure the impact 
of resource governance on conflict, with a sample of ninety-
two countries between 1996 and 2006, was carried out by 
Franke, Hampel-Milagrosa, and Schure (2007). Democratic 
oversight, transparent revenue-sharing, corruption control, 
a stable investment environment, and the implementation 
of international control regimes significantly reduce the li-
kelihood of violent conflict in resource-rich countries. An-
other quantitative analysis of fifty-seven countries over a 
period of thirty years confirms a previously developed 
model: the relative effectiveness of rulers and the popu-
lation in appropriating resources influences whether the 
ruler spends resource rents on the military or public goods 
when faced with a possible conflict (Sarr and Wick 2010).
Not all authors confirm the weak state model. In some 
cases, higher government revenues reduce the risk of con-
flict, where governments can spend more on the provision 
of public goods to appease opponents or on military ex-
penditures to deter rebellion. Thies (2010) tests the weak 
state mechanism with a different proxy for state capacity. 
Instead of income per capita, he uses government ex-
penditure relative to overall consumption, total revenue 
(government income), tax ratio (tax revenue as a per-
centage of GDP), and relative political capacity (an index 
comparing states with similar levels of development and 
resources). With these new measures of state capacity, 
Thies shows that primary commodities and state capacity 
do not influence the onset of civil war, with oil being an 
important exception. Second, almost all primary com-
modities, including oil, strengthen states. Thies shows that 
rebels and rulers compete for primary commodities, the 
former to gain financially and the latter to sustain revenue 
flows. When rulers face opposition, they manipulate prop-
erty rights to stay in power, effectively preventing conflict.
Thies is not alone in finding that oil abundance actually 
strengthens certain governments and reduces the risk of re-
bellion and, hence, violent conflict (Fjelde 2009; Basedau 
and Lay 2009; also Di John 2007). Although oil production 
and corruption increase conflict risks when they occur sep-
arately, conflicts (with at least 25 annual battle deaths) and 
civil wars (with at least 1,000 total battle deaths) are, ac-
cording to Di John, less likely to occur when oil production 
and corruption coincide. The political elite may use econ-
omic incentives strategically to induce cooperation and 
loyalty. Funding by oil, either to expand military ex-
penditure or to sustain political leaders’ patronage net-
works or both, has been central in Côte d’Ivoire (Guesnet, 
Müller, and Schure 2009), Nigeria (Renner 2002; Ikelegbe 
2006), and Chad (Frank and Guesnet 2009).
2.3 Resource Characteristics
Resources seem to be related to conflict in some cases but 
not in others. How accessible is a resource to potential re-
bels? Where is production located? How valuable is the pri-
mary commodity? Resource characteristics play an 
important role for the onset, duration and intensity of 
conflicts.
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Resources are diffuse or point, proximate or distant. These 
characteristics are part of what Le Billon calls “resource ac-
cessibility” (2005). Diffuse resources are spread over wide 
areas and produced by a large number of small operators 
(alluvial diamonds, gems, minerals, timber, coffee, ban-
anas, rubber), whereas point resources are the exact oppo-
site – concentrated in small areas and in the hands of a few 
producers (oil, gas, kimberlite diamonds, copper, iron). Re-
bels have better access to diffuse resources because they are 
usually not controlled by the government. Accessibility is 
also influenced by geographical location. Proximate re-
sources are located close to the center of power, distant re-
sources in remote areas that may be politically contested 
and/or near porous borders. Government control is 
stronger for proximate resources making illegal trade more 
difficult. A second broad category is “resource profit-
ability” determined by legality and value-to-weight ratio. 
Illegal resources are more profitable to rebels because gov-
ernments cannot engage in illegal trade. Legal resources 
can be traded by governments, and usually yield higher 
prices (Le Billon 2005). In Angola, for example, govern-
ment-controlled oil was more valuable than the diamonds 
funding the rebels, which is one reason why government 
forces defeated the rebels.
Another resource characteristic has been suggested. Ross 
(2003) refers to “lootability” to describe resources that can 
be extracted and transported relatively easily by small 
groups of unskilled workers. The lootable resources drugs, 
especially cocaine and opium, and diamonds are the ones 
that most often led to civil war between 1990 and 2000. Less 
significant are “obstructability” (risk of interrupted trans-
portation) and “legality” (tradable on international mar-
kets). High value-to-weight ratio resources (drugs, 
diamonds, gold) can be transported by plane and are, hence, 
more difficult to obstruct than low value-to-weight re-
sources transported by truck or train (many minerals). 
Liquid resources transported through pipelines (oil) face the 
highest risk of being blocked. Most resources are traded 
legally, with the exception of drugs. These characteristics can 
advantage either the government or rebel groups in civil war.
In a more recent comparative analysis (2004), Ross qualifies 
his previous conclusions: Oil increases the risk of conflict 
onset, while lootable resources (diamonds and drugs) only 
influence conflict duration, not onset. A quantitative study 
by Welsch (2008) confirms the importance of oil in pre-
dicting conflict between 1989 and 2002. Contrary to most 
other studies, oil is classified here as a lootable resource, as 
pipelines or extraction sites can easily be tapped. Unlike 
Ross (2004), Welsch finds that other mineral resources 
(bauxite, gold, diamonds) are also significant concerning 
the onset of civil war. This may be due to the different 
proxies for resource abundance (primary commodity ex-
ports vs. stock of subsoil assets) or the different thresholds 
for conflict. De Soysa (2002b) uses similar proxies for 
abundance and conflict and comes to the same conclusion 
as Welsch – rising levels of mineral resources increase the 
risk of conflict. But when energy (oil, gas, coal) and mineral 
(bauxite, copper, gold, among others) rents are dis-
aggregated and the period is extended (1970 to 1999), ener-
gy rents are more significant (de Soysa, Neumayer 2007).
The role of location is not restricted to proximity to central 
government. Several studies have tested whether resource 
location inside or outside the conflict zone influences civil 
war. Rebellion may be more attractive and feasible in re-
gions with abundant resources, regardless of the resource’s 
lootability. Testing the effect of resource abundance on 
conflict onset and duration using location as variable, Luja-
la (2010) finds that civil wars between 1946 and 2003 were 
likely to occur in regions with onshore oil and secondary 
diamond production. In addition, secondary diamonds, 
other gemstones, oil, and gas inside the conflict zone pro-
longed civil war. A novel finding is that non-lootable re-
sources (oil and gas) affect rebel movements and the 
duration of civil war, possibly because they are more loot-
able than previously assumed.
3. The Challenge of Definitions: Scarcity, Abundance, and Conflict
A challenge common to all studies is to define and oper-
ationalize the variables. Differences in central variables 
such as scarcity, abundance, and conflict reduce the com-
parability of the results of the studies we have presented 
throughout this paper.
Scarcity: Resources discussed in the literature on scarcity 
and conflict are generally renewable, widespread, and 
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require large labour inputs. Renewable resources regenerate 
naturally. They can be categorized into those that are sub-
ject to depletion (e.g. soil, woodland, and groundwater) 
and those that are infinite (solar, tidal, wind, geothermal). 
The scarcity literature focuses on the former. Examples in-
clude fish, wood, and land.
One central definition of scarcity can be traced back to 
Thomas R. Malthus’s “Essay on the Principle of Popu-
lation” (1798). Malthus writes that population and re-
sources are initially in equilibrium, but while populations 
grow exponentially, food production increases only lin-
early. The consequence is increasingly intense competition 
for shrinking food supplies. Resource scarcity is implicitly 
assumed to be absolute, threatening the means of existence. 
The depletion of natural resources eventually results in 
population collapse at the point when the earth’s carrying 
capacity is depleted. Baumgärtner and colleagues (2006) 
point out the difference between the Malthusian and the 
Ricardian understanding of scarcity. In the tradition of 
David Ricardo, scarcity refers to the decreasing quality of 
land as a natural resource.
The quantitative literature on resource scarcity has devel-
oped several variables to measure this kind of scarcity. 
Whether a renewable resource is scarce or not is often ap-
proximated by population growth/density or environ-
mental degradation variables (such as forest coverage, 
freshwater availability). When the demand for a resource 
increases or when the supply decreases, scarcity becomes 
more likely. Demand in a region rises if the population 
grows or becomes denser (Homer-Dixon 1994; Tir and 
Diehl 1998; Urdal 2005); supply is depleted as the resource 
is degraded (Bächler, Böge, and Klötzli 1996; Hauge and El-
lingsen 1998; Barnett and Adger 2007; Raleigh and Urdal 
2007). Quantitative studies that do not use these indepen-
dent variables come to different conclusions. Binningsbø, 
de Soysa, and Gleditsch (2007), for example, measure en-
vironmental degradation with the ecological footprint, bio-
capacity, ecological reserve (or deficit) and Brown (2010) 
uses the Normalized Difference Vegetation Index. The eco-
logical footprint represents the consumption of land and 
water for consumption and production purposes in the 
consumer country, which, if subtracted from biocapacity, is 
the ecological reserve or deficit. Biocapacity is the ecological 
supply. The NDVI measures the sunlight reflected by plants 
to determine the density of green vegetation. Both authors 
are unable to confirm previous results about a positive link 
between scarcity and conflict. A critical discussion of the 
term scarcity can also be found in De Soysa (2002a).
Absolute scarcity needs to be distinguished from relative 
scarcity. Absolute scarcity is often equated with Malthus’s 
concept of scarcity: there is not enough of the resource to 
secure everyone’s survival. According to Baumgärtner and 
colleagues (2006), a good is absolutely scarce if it cannot be 
substituted by other goods on neither the production nor 
on the consumption side. They refer to relative scarcity 
where a good is scarce in relation to other goods, meaning 
that obtaining it incurs opportunity costs. In contrast to 
absolutely scarce goods, relatively scarce ones are sub-
stitutable. Resources are also not absolutely scarce if access 
to them is denied simply because one group controls them. 
Access can be restricted by institutions (or lack thereof) 
(Giordano 2005) or historical power relations (Gausset, 
Whyte, and Birch-Thomson 2005).
Abundance: The literature on resource abundance and con-
flict generally focuses on highly profitable depletable re-
sources such as minerals, metals, oil, and diamonds. Finite, 
non-renewable resources formed during the course of the 
earth’s history, and although they are replenished in geo-
logical cycles, this does not occur within any human time-
frame. Examples include oil, gas, diamonds, and metals. 
Measuring their domestic abundance is a challenge. Ac-
cordingly, earlier studies did not clearly differentiate be-
tween abundance, intensity, and dependence, using these 
terms interchangeably. Proxies used to measure the import-
ance of resources for a country were the share of primary 
commodity exports in the total exports of a country and 
the share of primary commodity exports in GDP. As Davis 
explains (2009), this approach infers endowments from a 
country’s revealed comparative advantage. But as Wright 
and Czelusta point out (2004), this may simply reflect an 
absence of other internationally competitive sectors in the 
economy rather than resource abundance. The WTO com-
piled a list of countries highly dependent on resource ex-
ports (2010): fuel makes up more than 90 percent of total 
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exports in Kuwait, Venezuela, Algeria, Nigeria, and Angola. 
While mining products generally represent a much smaller 
share, they still dominate exports in many countries, such 
as Zambia (80 percent), Chile (60 percent), Niger (58 per-
cent), Jamaica (56 percent), and Peru (43 percent). But this 
tells us little about the geological availability of the re-
source in these countries.
Humphreys (2005) points out that primary commodity ex-
ports do not produce an exact index of the resource situ-
ation because they exclude illegal trade (for example in 
diamonds) and include re-export of imported resources. 
He therefore suggests alternative measures: level of pro-
duction, proven reserves, and share of GDP. Lederman and 
Maloney (2008) as well as Blanco and Grier (2008) argue 
against using the ratio of primary commodity exports to 
GDP, proposing instead to measure natural resource abun-
dance as the value of net exports of resource-intensive 
commodities per worker. Other authors have proposed 
using the location of certain resources (Lujala 2010), re-
source production (Humphreys 2005), or natural resource 
stocks per capita (de Soysa 2002b). Basedau and Lacher 
(2006) show that none of these indices, which measure de-
pendence rather than abundance of resources, reflect how 
well a country is endowed with resources (its resource 
wealth). They argue that a distinct differentiation offers in-
teresting results: Dependent, rather than resource-
abundant, countries face higher risks. This is confirmed by 
a later quantitative analysis by Basedau and Lay (2009), 
who engage in a discussion about resource wealth and de-
pendence. Brunnschweiler (2006) also makes the important 
distinction between resource abundance and resource de-
pendence. In her analysis, abundance describes the amount 
of natural capital that a country has at its disposal: mineral 
deposits, oil fields, forests, land, and the like. According to 
the OECD, “natural capital are natural assets in their role of 
providing natural resource inputs and environmental ser-
vices for economic production” (2005). Brunnschweiler de-
fines dependence, on the other hand, as the extent to which 
a nation depends on these natural resources for its liveli-
hood, for growth, income, and exports. Kropf (2010) also 
underlines the difference between resource dependence and 
abundance, noting that variables such as “resource exports 
to GDP” introduce a bias that makes less developed econ-
omies per se more resource “abundant” than developed 
economies. She argued for new variables that exclude in-
formation on a country’s stage of development.
Not all studies employ these definitions carefully, however. 
By no means are all countries characterized as resource-
rich actually rich in resources, measured in terms of natu-
ral capital; they may in fact be dependent on them. The 
possible negative policy implications of faulty char-
acterizations are evident: Presumed resource wealth can 
discourage a much needed diversification of the economy.
Distinguishing scarcity and abundance: The literature shows 
that it is difficult to draw a distinct line between resource 
scarcity and abundance as cause or accelerator of conflicts. 
First, most natural resources are not characterized by ab-
solute (physical) scarcity. Many resources – apart from a 
few existential resources such as land and water – can be 
substituted, many are renewable, and many of those that 
are non-renewable can be recycled. What matters more 
than absolute scarcity is relative scarcity, here defined as the 
allocation of resources (and revenues from resources) and 
access to them. Likewise, absolute abundance does not 
exist. Throughout the literature, resources are, in general, 
considered abundant when they are plentiful in a given re-
gion, and potential sources for high profits. On the global 
level, however, they are often in great demand and scarce.
Conflict: The term conflict requires more specification as 
well. According to the Heidelberg Institute for Inter-
national Conflict Research (HIIK), conflicts are “clashes of 
interest (differences of position) concerning national valu-
es (territory, secession, decolonization, autonomy, system/
ideology, national power, regional predominance, 
international power, resources, other). These clashes are of 
a certain duration and scope, involving at least two parties 
(organized groups, states, groups of states, organizations of 
states) determined to pursue their interests and win their 
cases” (HIIK 2010). They can be subcategorized into: latent 
conflicts (non-violent of low intensity), manifest conflicts 
(non-violent of high intensity), crises (violent), severe 
crises (violent), and wars (violent). The most frequently 
used data set for quantitative studies is the Uppsala Con-
flict Data Program, which includes conflicts where at least 
IJCV : Vol. 5 (1) 2011, pp. 155 – 172
Mildner, Wodni, and Lauster: Scarcity and Abundance Revisited 169
one party is the government of a state, and the use of 
armed force results in at least 25 battle-related deaths per 
year. Other analyses deviate from this definition, including 
conflicts between non-state groups or a higher threshold 
for battle-related deaths. This can be important for con-
flicts involving scarce resources, since they involve the gov-
ernment less than conflicts over abundant resources do. 
The Political Instability Task Force expands the definition 
of conflict by considering not only a threshold but also the 
intention of the combating parties.
Quantitative studies usually include a variable for violent 
incidents between two or more groups, one of them being 
the government, causing a varying number of annual battle 
deaths. The operationalization of the variable varies widely. 
Hauge and Ellingsen (1998), for example, define their 
“incident” variable as domestic armed conflict (between 
two or more organized parties at least one of which is the 
government, with at least 25 annual battle deaths) and civil 
war (at least 1,000 annual battle deaths). As a proxy for the 
severity of conflict they use battle deaths as a percentage of 
the total population. Qualitative studies dealing with re-
source scarcity often also consider conflicts without gov-
ernment involvement (intercommunal conflicts). They also 
employ a broader understanding of conflict ranging from 
demonstrations and raids to insurgency and war. This 
complexity makes analysis and subsequent generalization 
of findings more difficult.
4. Conclusion
Opinions on the explanatory power of resource scarcity for 
violent conflict clearly diverge. While scarcity of resources 
is considered an independent variable by some, others 
examine it as a dependent or intervening variable. Several 
of the reviewed studies find that scarcity has adverse effects 
on peace, although a few consider it to be a motor of inno-
vation. Most of the time, when decreasing supply meets in-
creasing demand, existing frictions in a society are 
exacerbated, catalyzing conflict. Migration of a different 
ethnic group, for example, makes the receiving region more 
vulnerable to conflict. However, the empirical findings re-
main rather weak. A clear causal relationship cannot be es-
tablished convincingly. On the contrary, there are multiple 
mechanisms connecting demand/supply of resources, scar-
city, and conflict. Scarcity (and conflict) do not develop 
automatically, depending on the (political, social, and cul-
tural) context. More recent studies incorporate short- and 
long-term context-specific factors, such as integration into 
international markets, economic development, property re-
gimes, government interventions, composition of the com-
munity, historical inequalities, and community-specific 
values and norms. More research concerning the causal 
mechanisms is needed.
With regard to resource abundance and conflict, many 
scholars agree that certain – locally abundant – natural re-
sources can under certain conditions increase the potential 
for conflict through several coexistent mechanisms. But 
quantitative studies are only meaningful if the independent 
and dependent variable are specified. So far, however, re-
searchers have not agreed on a measure of resource abun-
dance. Hence, results are mixed and statements about the 
relationship between abundance and conflict cannot be 
made with confidence. Quantitative studies investigating 
the role of resource characteristics are still limited. Thus, 
we find significant desiderata that attest an urgent need for 
more research in this field.
Overall we urge scholars to invest more time in oper-
ationalizing their independent and dependent variables, 
foremost resource scarcity, resource abundance, and con-
flict, but also their intervening variables such as state ca-
pacity, in order to produce convincing results. In the long 
run, an in-depth investigation of interstate conflict is 
necessary in order to uncover which resources are most 
prone to trigger conflict between states.
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